Let's start with an excerpt from the very promising abstract:
"Abstract: Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechanical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advancements in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure."(Note: In the Olden Days, we also had systems which "pervasively monitored and controlled " cars, they were called "drivers").
Damn right, cars have become more computerized and the systems are networked- and now more vehicles have multiple wireless communication systems, most (if not all) with some level of access to the onboard networks. There's a recipe for a playground of badness. So is this paper. Rather than shred it entirely, I'll call out a few things which set me off.
But first, venture back in time with me. In the early sixties, we had cars with electrically-controlled transmissions. Not especially reliable, but we had them. Cars had computers before that, but we didn't call them that. They were called "automatic transmissions", controlled by hydraulic decision engines which selected the appropriate gear based an a variety of variable inputs- including throttle position, engine load, engine speed, road speed- all under amazing temperature and vibration extremes. There have been a lot of interesting technologies in autos, often appearing earlier than people realize. And tinkerers, mechanics, racers, gear-heads, whatever you want to call them started hacking cars and their systems as soon as they got their hands on them. And it was not new with cars, we've tinkered and pushed the limits of stuff since crawling out of the primordial ooze. I think a weekend in the pits at an SCCA event might prove eye opening for many- the creativity is amazing.
Diving into a few specifics of the paper, we don't make it out of the first page before we get our first warning:
"Through 80 years of mass-production, the passenger automobile has remained superficially static: a single gasoline-powered internal combustion engine; four wheels; and the familiar user interface of steering wheel, throttle, gearshift, and brake. However, in the past two decades the underlying control systems have changed dramatically."Maybe we'll let this slide, a bit of hyperbole to start the paper off. We'll ignore diesel engines, the move from manual to automatic transmissions, front to rear wheel drive, etc. But then we get to:
"While the automotive industry has always considered safety a critical engineering concern (indeed, much of this new software has been introduced specifically to increase safety, e.g., Anti-lock Brake Systems)"Anti-lock brakes have certainly evolved considerably, but ABS was effectively mandated for heavy trucks by US FMVSS 121 in 1975. Yeah, Gerry Ford was in the White House, scourge of disco was beginning to destroy a generation, and polyester was an acceptable fabric for something called the "leisure suit". Not quite "new" systems. Maybe I'm still nitpicking. Cars are different than trucks (but not that different in many ways). There really is a lot of good information in this paper. (Of course, if they had let their mechanics read it after getting their cars serviced it would have been a lot better).
Then, we get to this gem:
"In this paper we intentionally and explicitly skirt the question of a threat model. Instead, we focus primarily on what an attacker could do to a car if she was able to maliciously communicate on the car’s internal network. That said, this does beg the question of how she might be able to gain such access.
"While we leave a full analysis of the modern automobile’s attack surface to future research, we briefly describe here the two kinds of vectors by which one might gain access to a car’s internal networks. The first is physical access."Another little insight for you: if I have physical access to your car, I can now do with a computer, cables and custom software what has been possible for almost eighty years with a pocketknife- damage your brakes. (Note, cars have been around for over a century, but use of hydraulic brakes was not widespread until the thirties). You can really get creative with digital attacks, but you've been able to do creative brake damage by exploiting physical and hydraulic vulnerabilities, there's plenty more than simply cutting lines which can be done. Switching gears (sorry, had to) to traditional information security, ignoring the threat model is best practices. No, wait, ignoring threat models it is a horrible idea, but sadly common.
"The other vector is via the numerous wireless interfaces implemented in the modern automobile."Now we're talking, this is a huge problem (at least potentially), and it needs a lot of research. Skipping forward to section IV. C., there is more critical information. Not surprising, but important- there are poor standards, implemented poorly and un-enforced. That is not shocking to those of us in infosec, but especially scary when we're talking about interaction of physical safety systems. It is a bit depressing that they are surprised by this, and surprised how easily the systems fell to fuzzing attacks, another sign that the authors may not have the real-world experience I would like.
I'll continue the rantview in an upcoming post, but I may become snarky, and possibly mean about it.